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FOR THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILDREN: WHY THE HAGUE
CONVENTION ON INTERCOUNTRY
ADOPTION NEEDS TO GO FARTHER, AS
EVIDENCED BY IMPLEMENTATION IN
ROMANIA AND THE UNITED STATES
Elisabeth J. Ryan*
Abstract: International adoption is a common occurrence in today’s so-
ciety. In order to address the dangers linked with international adoption
such as baby trafªcking, the members of the Hague Conference on Pri-
vate International Law produced the Hague Convention on Intercountry
Adoption in 1993, setting forth a minimum base of standards that every
ratifying government must abide by, placing the best interests of the child
above all other considerations. The United States, via the Intercountry
Adoption Act of 2000, is well on its way to fully realizing the Hague Con-
vention mandates. Romania, however, has struggled to care for its chil-
dren and subsequently imposed an international adoption ban. This Note
argues that the Hague Conference members need to amend the Hague
Convention in order to implement assistance for countries that may
struggle with its mandates. It also argues that, in order to avoid more nu-
anced problems in implementation, the Hague Convention should clarify
its vague language. Finally, it should include appeals and enforcement
procedures so that conºicts between two countries over an adoption pro-
ceeding can be dealt with by a third party.
Introduction
On December 26, 2004, a tsunami devastated the coasts of Indo-
nesia, India, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and seven other countries in South-
east Asia;1 it killed an estimated 216,000 people.2 As media images of
the tragedy deluged the Western world, adoption agencies began
                                                                                                                     
* Elisabeth J. Ryan is the Senior Articles Editor for the Boston College International &
Comparative Law Review. This Note is for her cousin Lily.
1 See, e.g., Michael Elliott, Sea of Sorrow, Time, Jan. 10, 2005, at 31.
2 See, e.g., Tsunami Death Toll Is at Least 216,000, Star-Ledger (Newark, N.J.), Dec. 27,
2005, at 21, available at 2005 WLNR 21015950.
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ªelding calls from concerned families eager to open their homes to
children orphaned by the disaster.3 As well-meaning as such people
were, however, international adoptions in times of crisis are com-
pletely unrealistic, as well as extremely ill-advised.4 Initially, intercoun-
try adoptions in the United States depend not only on the law of the
child’s originating country but also on the law of the receiving fam-
ily’s state, and federal immigration law.5 The process can take several
years of paperwork, investigation, home study, and other administra-
tive matters.6 Additionally, there are extensive restrictions on who can
adopt children as well as which children can be adopted.7 The
ªnancial expense also can be enormous, averaging $10,000-$30,000
without any major obstacles.8
However impractical the rush of adoption interests may be after a
disaster such as the 2004 tsunami, it is not a new phenomenon, and it
arises most every time a political crisis or national disaster brings im-
ages of forlorn children to the forefront.9 In particular, after Romanian
Communist dictator Nicolae Ceausescu was overthrown and executed
in December 1989,10 popular television shows such as ABC’s “20/20”11
and CBS’s “60 Minutes”12 broadcasted horrifying images of thousands
of children living in orphanages marked by grossly inhumane condi-
tions.13 The result of the graphic media coverage was a deluge of calls
to adoption agencies from people wanting to rescue the suffering chil-
dren.14
                                                                                                                     
3 See Siri Agrell, ‘I Saw This Kid on TV, That’s the Kid I Want’: Agencies Besieged by Calls,
Nat’l Post (Can.), Jan. 14, 2005, at A3, available at 2005 WL 59969520.
4 See Steve Friess, Adoption Not Best Way to Help Victims Now, Experts Say, USA Today, Jan.
10, 2005, at 4A, available at 2005 WLNR 335847.
5 See Elizabeth Bartholet, International Adoption: Propriety, Prospects, and Pragmatics, 13 J.
Am. Acad. Matrim. Law. 181, 186 (1996); Bridget M. Hubing, Student Article, Interna-
tional Child Adoptions: Who Should Decide What Is in the Best Interests of the Family?, 15 Notre
Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 655, 684–90 (2001).
6 Bartholet, supra note 5, at 189. See generally Stephen Lewin, Adoption of Children from
Outside of the United States, in Litigation and Administrative Practice Course Hand-
book Series 287, 287 (Practicing Law Institute 2004), available at 199 PLI/Crim 287 (de-
scribing the step-by-step procedures and requirements for an adoption in the United
States of a child located in another country).
7 See e.g., Lewin, supra note 6, at 296–304; Hubing, supra note 5, at 666–73.
8 Bartholet, supra note 5, at 190.
9 See Agrell, supra note 3.
10 Steven Kreis, Lectures on Twentieth Century Europe: Nicolae Ceausescu, 1918–1989
(2004), http://www.historyguide.org/europe/ceausescu.html.
11 See Hubing, supra note 5, at 657 n.3, 658 n.9.
12 See Bartholet, supra note 5, at 200 n.44.
13 Id. at 201; Agrell, supra note 3.
14 Agrell, supra note 3.
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But while times of political and social crises tend to peak interest
in (and provide extensive media coverage of) international adoptions,
such adoption is a common and everyday practice among dozens of
nations.15 Countries involved in the increasing instances of such in-
ternational adoptions have expressed concerns such as who can adopt
children, which children can be adopted, and what constitutes the
best interests of such children.16 The countries have also faced addi-
tional fears about baby selling on the black market, either to people
desperate for a child, or more sinisterly, to people looking to trafªc
children into slave labor, prostitution, or pornography.17
Almost 20,000 girls under the age of sixteen are sex slaves in
Cambodia; 200,000 children in West and Central Africa are enslaved
into forced labor, and between 18,000–20,000 individuals (which in-
cludes adults and children) are trafªcked into the United States every
year.18 As recently as November 2004, the British press reported that
undercover investigators in Romania took mere minutes to ªnd par-
ents willing to sell their babies outright for as little as 500 Euros (ap-
proximately $663).19
This threat of child trafªcking is especially acute in the tsunami-
ravaged countries.20 The Indian government instituted a ban on all in-
ternational adoptions beginning on January 5, 2005, after widespread
concerns that adoption amidst the tsunami rebuilding efforts might
provide a cover for snatching children in order to force them into
cheap labor in factories or into the sex trade.21 Additionally, such chil-
dren faced enormous trauma during and after the disaster, and uproot-
                                                                                                                     
15 See Lewin, supra note 6, at 291.
16 See Hubing, supra note 5, at 666–68.
17 See Jay Shankar, Call for Adoption Ban to Save Indian Tsunami Orphans from Trafªckers,
Agence France-Presse (Fr.), Jan. 6, 2005, available at 1/6/05 AGFRP 11:21:00 [hereinaf-
ter Call For Adoption Ban]; Cindy Sui, China’s Unspoken Shame: Parents Are Chief Culprits in
Baby Trafªcking, Agence France-Presse (Fr.), Feb. 10, 2005, available at 2/10/05 AGFRP
13:08:00 [hereinafter China’s Unspoken Shame]; EU: Frattini Announces Crackdown on Human
Trafªcking, ANSA-Pol. & Econ. News Serv., Dec. 22, 2004, available at 2004 WL
103595532.
18 See Linda Smith & Mohamed Mattar, Creating International Consensus on Combating
Trafªcking in Persons: U.S. Policy, the Role of the UN, and Global Responses and Challenges, 28
Fletcher F. World Aff. 155, 158–59 (2004).
19 The European Capital Where Babies Can Be Bought for Just £350, W. Daily Press (Eng.),
Nov. 23, 2004, at 8, available at 2004 WL 64463905.
20 See, e.g., Call For Adoption Ban, supra note 17.
21 Id.; Eva C. Komandjaja, Govt. Bans Adoption to Protect Orphans, Jakarta Post (In-
don.), Jan. 5, 2005, at 2, available at 2005 WLNR 132347.
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ing them to face a new family and surroundings so quickly would only
add onto that stress and psychological damage.22
To address all the concerns surrounding international adoption,
sixty-eight countries convened in 1993 to draft the Hague Convention
on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry
Adoption (Hague Convention),23 the ªrst treaty establishing minimum
standards in international adoption procedures.24 Despite this major
step to regulate intercountry adoptions, however, the Hague Conven-
tion falls far short of ensuring the best interests of children involved in
international adoptions.25
Part I of this Note discusses the general history of international
adoption, with particular focus on the development of the Hague Con-
vention on Intercountry Adoption, the status of children in Romania,
and the status of international adoption in the United States. Part II
focuses on the major aspects of the Hague Convention, as well as the
failure of Romania to implement the Hague Convention, and the
United States’ imminent success in doing so. Part III argues that the
Hague Convention signatory countries should take a more active role
in ensuring that the Hague Convention is carried out where it is most
needed, speciªcally in countries like Romania. It also highlights the
need for the Hague Convention to be amended in order to clarify cer-
tain aspects of language, as well as institute an appeals process so that
countries like the United States can fully beneªt from the Hague Con-
vention.
I. History and Background
A. Competing Viewpoints on the Merits of International Adoption
The United States and other wealthy, Western, industrialized na-
tions with low birthrates and relatively small numbers of children in
need of homes take in the largest number of internationally adopted
children.26 These children are adopted from poor countries with high
birthrates and huge numbers of homeless or institutionalized chil-
                                                                                                                     
22 See Komandjaja, supra note 21.
23 Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Inter-
country Adoption, May 29, 1993, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-51, 32 I.L.M. 1134 [hereinafter
Hague Convention].
24 See id. intro, 32 I.L.M. at 1134.
25 See Bartholet, supra note 5, at 194–95.
26 Id. at 181.
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dren.27 Wealthy countries have seen a decrease in domestic adoptable
children due to the availability of abortion, contraception, family plan-
ning education, and a reduced stigma against single parenting.28 In
contrast, the home countries of internationally adopted children tend
to be marred by political strife, war, and often devastating levels of pov-
erty.29 Stark political and economic differences create a virtual supply-
and-demand economy of children,30 but controversy nonetheless rages
over the practice of international adoption.31
Critics condemn international adoption as exploitative,32 imperi-
alistic,33 and detrimental to children because of the separation from
their home culture and society.34 Supporters of international adop-
tion, however, stress that the practice provides the only realistic op-
portunity for many children to have a permanent home and family.35
Both supporters and opponents rely on the best interests of the chil-
dren to back up their views and arguments.36
B. History of the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption
To address speciªc problems with international adoption—namely
the creation of legally binding standards, a system of supervision to en-
sure observation of those legal standards, and communication and co-
operation between authorities in both countries involved in any par-
ticular adoption—the Hague Conference of Private International Law
(Hague Conference) produced the Hague Convention on Protection
of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption in
                                                                                                                     
27 Id. at 182.
28 Id. at 181.
29 See id. at 182.
30 See Crystal J. Gates, Note, China’s Newly Enacted Intercountry Adoption Law: Friend or
Foe?, 7 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 369, 376 (1999) (explaining that framing the interna-
tional adoption debate in terms of supply-and-demand reduces the humanity of the chil-
dren involved); Jacqueline Bhabha, Moving Babies: Globalization, Markets and Transnational
Adoption, 28 Fletcher F. World Aff. 181, 182–83 (2004) (noting that it is more of a de-
mand-driven economy, as the ample “supply” of children would exist independently).
31 Bartholet, supra note 5, at 183; see Kathleen Ja Sook Bergquist, International Asian
Adoption: In the Best Interest of the Child?, 10 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 343, 347 (2004);
Hubing, supra note 5, at 663–66.
32 See Bartholet, supra note 5, at 182.
33 Hubing, supra note 5, at 660.
34 See Bartholet, supra note 5, at 182.
35 See id. at 182, 197.
36 See id. at 184.
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May 1993.37 Participating in the deliberations were almost all thirty-
eight Hague Conference Member States and thirty invited non-
member states, chosen particularly because of their role in interna-
tional adoption.38 Overall, the Hague Convention sought to establish
that any international adoptions are in the best interest of the child,
above everything else.39
The Hague Convention marked the ªrst major development of
international minimum standards in intercountry adoption proce-
dures.40 All states that sign the Hague Convention show an intention
to ratify it, though no further action is necessary; those that do ratify
the Hague Convention are then legally bound to apply it to their do-
mestic and international laws.41
Just four years earlier, in 1989, the United Nations adopted the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).42 The main philosophy
of the CRC is that society has an obligation to meet the fundamental
needs of children.43 These obligations include not only basics like
health care and education, but also a range of social, political, and
civil rights for all children.44 The CRC has reached almost universal
ratiªcation, an unprecedented status for a human rights treaty.45
The CRC is purposely neutral, however, on adoption in general.46
Several traditionally “receiving” countries47 in international adoption,
such as the United States, had lobbied for language that would have
obligated all countries to take “appropriate measures to facilitate
permanent adoption of the child.”48 Such language would seem to be
harmonious with the rest of the document, which places a great deal
of emphasis on the role of the family as the “fundamental group of
                                                                                                                     
37 Hague Convention, supra note 23, intro., 32 I.L.M. at 1134; Sarah Sargent, Suspended
Animation: The Implementation of the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption on the United
States and Romania, 10 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 351, 354–55 (2004).
38 Hague Convention, supra note 23, intro., 32 I.L.M. at 1134.
39 See Sargent, supra note 37, at 355.
40 Hague Convention, supra note 23, intro., 32 I.L.M. at 1134.
41 Sargent, supra note 37, at 354.
42 G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 (Nov. 20, 1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M.
1448 (1989) [hereinafter CRC].
43 Rebeca Rios-Kohn, Intercountry Adoption: An International Perspective on the Practice and
Standards, 1(4) Adoption Q. 3, 11 ( June 1998).
44 Id.
45 Id. at 4.
46 Id. at 14.
47 Countries in which foreign children tend to be adopted are known as “receiving”
countries; countries from which children tend to be adopted are known as “sending”
countries. See Bartholet, supra note 5, at 186.
48 Rios-Kahn, supra note 43, at 14.
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society and the natural environment for the growth and well-being of
all [society’s] members and particularly children.”49 The UN member
states, however, rejected language that would have explicitly cemented
an obligation for nations to facilitate adoption because adoption was
not the sole option for providing children with families.50 Addition-
ally, some drafters emphasized that adoption frequently contravened
the best interests of the child, and thus would have been inconsistent
with the objective of the document to protect the rights of the child.51
The Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption proved to be a
more detailed consideration of dissenters’ objections to the CRC’s fail-
ure to facilitate international adoption.52 The Hague Convention ad-
dressed the need for legal processes to crack down on threats like
falsiªcation of documents, abduction and sale of children, and unregu-
lated organizations essentially running the adoption process.53 In the
most basic sense, the agreement recognized a need for a minimum set
of international standards governing international adoptions—rules
that each participating state could examine, adopt, abide by, and be
conªdent that other ratiªers were doing so as well.54
C. History of Child Welfare in Romania and the Country’s Role in
International Adoption
In few countries has the plight of orphans been as tragic or as pub-
licized as in Romania.55 During Nicolae Ceausescu’s rule of Communist
Romania beginning in 1944, he forced every woman to bear ªve chil-
dren while simultaneously banning birth control and abortion,56 result-
ing in tens of thousands of unwanted babies being left in state institu-
tions run by a government in which corruption was insidious.57 Since
Ceausescu’s overthrow in 1989, approximately 30,000 Romanian chil-
dren have been adopted worldwide,58 including some 8,300 by Ameri-
                                                                                                                     
49 See CRC, supra note 42, pmbl.
50 See Rios-Kahn, supra note 43, at 14.
51 See id.
52 See id. at 15.
53 Id.
54 See id. at 15–16.
55 See Bartholet, supra note 5, at 200–01.
56 Margaret Liu, Comment, International Adoptions: An Overview, 8 Temp. Int’l & Comp.
L.J. 187, 187 (1994).
57 See Noelle Knox, Orphans Caught in the Middle, USA Today, May 18, 2004, at D1,
available at 2004 WL 58556956.
58 Romania: New Law Hinders Adoptions by Foreigners, ANSA-Eng. News Serv., Jan. 6,
2005, available at 1/6/05 ANSA 12:03:00 [hereinafter Romania: New Law].
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cans.59 An estimated 40,000 children, however, still remain in orphan-
ages.60 After the media exposed the squalid conditions of Romania’s
orphanages and institutions to the outside world, the country’s authori-
ties undertook a supposed major overhaul to improve the lives of chil-
dren.61
Signiªcant ªnancial contributions from foreign governments and
various non-governmental organizations allowed immediate su-
perªcial developments.62 The government made visible improvements
to the physical institutions, including carpeting, televisions, and toys.63
While these improvements certainly contributed to better living con-
ditions for children in the immediate sense, they proved to be short-
lived and addressed public relations more than the root of the prob-
lem.64 Abject poverty, government mismanagement, and the lack of
any coherent long-term strategy to improve the living standards of
Romanian citizens remained serious problems.65 The Bucharest-based
Institute for Researching the Quality of Life reported in 1993 that
only 10.3% of Romanian children lived in decent conditions, while a
staggering 56.6% lived in poverty.66
The severe economic difªculty of Romanian citizens may have
been the primary reason that many children were abandoned by their
families to orphanages, but numerous other factors also contrib-
uted.67 These include an increase in mothers under the age of twenty,
ethnic origin (in particular, Roma families68 have had high birth rates,
extremely low income, and high rates of delinquency), and limited
access to any form of family planning.69 The Romanian government
structure also contributed to high rates of abandonment due to a lack
of social services and a policy in the ªrst years after 1989 that encour-
aged institutionalization of children.70
                                                                                                                     
59 Knox, supra note 57.
60 Romania: New Law, supra note 58.
61 See Camelia Manuela Lataianu, Social Protection of Children in Public Care in Romania
From the Perspective of EU Integration, 17 Int’l J.L. Pol’y & Fam. 99, 99 (2003).
62 See id. at 104.
63 Id.
64 See id. at 99.
65 See id. at 100.
66 Lataianu, supra note 61, at 100.
67 See id.
68 Roma are sometimes called Gypsies. B.A. Robinson, The Religion and Culture of the
Roma, http://www.religioustolerance.org/roma.htm.
69 Lataianu, supra note 61, at 101.
70 Id. at 101.
2006] The Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption 361
The newly democratic Romanian government repealed the law
that prohibited abortion almost immediately after the overthrow of
1989, leading some to expect that the number of abandoned babies
would decrease signiªcantly in the coming years.71 By 1994, however,
the number of children residing in institutions had actually surpassed
1990 ªgures by 15%.72 When Romania was still under Communist
control, the government required children to leave residential care at
the age of eighteen, providing them with state jobs and housing, even
though most of them lacked any employment qualiªcations.73 But af-
ter the Communist collapse, such children had virtually no chance of
ªnding a job and being able to live on their own.74 Thus, most of
them simply remained in institutions well after their eighteenth
birthdays, despite the requirements of the law.75
The post-Ceausescu government initially encouraged international
adoption, which contributed to a decrease in institutionalized children
in the ªrst years of the 1990s.76 But then the government abruptly
passed legislation severely limiting international adoptions, thus con-
tributing to the startling rise in institutionalized children as shown in
the 1994 ªgures.77
But by the mid-1990s, external events brought new changes to
Romania.78 In 1993, the government signed an Association Agree-
ment aimed at allowing it to become part of the European Union
(EU).79 In order to bring membership into force, however, the EU
placed four conditions on Romania, including recognition of democ-
racy and human rights.80 The EU Commission Opinion on Romania’s
Application for Membership declared that the condition of children
in the country was a human rights priority.81
To this end, Romania became one of the ªrst three countries to
sign and ratify the Hague Convention in 1994.82 Romania’s dual
                                                                                                                     
71 See id. at 102.
72 Id.
73 See id. at 103.




78 See id. at 112.
79 Id.
80 See Lataianu, supra note 61, at 112. The other conditions were a functioning market
economy, a capacity to compete within the EU market, and an ability to adhere to the po-
litical, economic, and monetary aims of the EU. Id. at 112–13.
81 Id. at 113, 114.
82 Sargent, supra note 37, at 355.
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commitment to the Hague Convention and to the EU’s requirements
that children’s rights be prioritized seemed to be in harmony.83 But
the goals eventually clashed, and pressure from the EU resulted in a
ban rendering international adoption practically impossible.84
D. History of International Adoption in the United States
The United States is the destination for nearly half of all interna-
tionally adopted children.85 Intercountry adoption was virtually non-
existent until the aftermath of World War II, when members of the
U.S. armed forces returned home with tales of children orphaned in
the war-ravaged countries of Germany, Italy, Greece, and the rest of
Europe.86 These orphans were largely white and “ªrst-world,” leading
Americans to open their homes, willing for the ªrst time to provide a
compassionate home for children victimized by world events.87
International adoption gained true widespread acceptance in the
United States after the Korean War when U.S. GIs returned home
having fathered stigmatized children overseas with Korean women.88
Some 38,000 Korean children were adopted in the United States from
1953–1981.89 In 1996, however, the Korean government (cementing a
trend in policy that began in the 1970s) banned all international adop-
tions of Korean children by foreigners.90
Presently, most foreign-born children adopted in the United States
are from China.91 Due to the ofªcial Chinese government policy of one
child per family, thousands of Chinese babies—overwhelmingly female
in a culture that values males over females—are abandoned each year,
resulting in crowded institutional orphanages.92 The implications of the
Hague Convention are particularly relevant to the United States be-
                                                                                                                     
83 See Lataianu, supra note 61, at 107; Sargent, supra note 37, at 355.
84 See, e.g., Romania: New Law, supra note 58.
85 Hubing, supra note 5, at 660 (stating that out of estimated 20,000 international
adoptions each year, nearly half involve U.S. citizens as the adoptive parents).
86 See id. at 661.
87 See Bergquist, supra note 31, at 344.
88 See id. at 343; Hubing, supra note 5, at 662.
89 Hubing, supra note 5, at 662.
90 See id.
91 Id.
92 Gabriela Marquez, Comment, Transnational Adoption: The Creation and Ill Effects of an
International Black Market Baby Trade, 21 J. Juv. L. 25, 29–30 (2000); see China’s Unspoken
Shame, supra note 17.
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cause of the country’s extensive involvement in the practice of interna-
tional adoption.93
II. Discussion
A. Major Aspects of the Hague Convention
The most basic and vital purpose of the Hague Convention is to
ensure that intercountry adoptions are made “in the best interests of
the child.”94 Signiªcantly, it recognizes, for the ªrst time in an interna-
tional agreement, that international adoption may itself be in the best
interest of the child.95 The Hague Convention states that every child
should grow up in a family environment, and that international adop-
tion may be the only way to achieve this end for some children.96 Thus,
the Hague Convention not only provides an avenue to ensure that in-
ternational adoptions are safe and legal, but it also implicitly encour-
ages international adoption over less beneªcial alternatives such as
home-country institutionalization or even domestic adoption.97
The Hague Convention’s regulation of international adoption
requires each ratifying country to undergo major internal changes in
their international adoption processes.98 Because these changes en-
courage smooth and accountable procedures, they represent a clear
endorsement of international adoption.99 The Hague Convention re-
quires that each state party create a Central Authority to oversee all
intercountry adoptions involving that state.100 Considering the time
and resources required to institute these changes, international adop-
tion necessarily takes a prominent place in the state’s social and po-
litical consciousness.101
                                                                                                                     
93 See Hubing, supra note 5, at 660.
94 See Hague Convention, supra note 23, pmbl.
95 See id.; Bartholet, supra note 5, at 192; Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Dept. of State,
Hague Convention: Advantages and Provisions (2005), http://travel.state.gov/family/adop-
tion/convention/convention_2300.html.
96 See Hague Convention, supra note 23, pmbl.
97 See id. pmbl., art. 1.
98 See id. arts. 6–13. Some of these changes are setting up a Central Authority, commu-
nicating with other countries’ Central Authorities, and accrediting and monitoring adop-
tion agencies. Id.
99 See id. Even though the Hague Convention never explicitly states this proposition, it
is clear that, taken as a whole, the Convention endorses the practice of international adop-
tion. See id.
100 Hague Convention, supra note 23, arts. 6–13.
101 Cf. Rios-Kohn, supra note 43, at 27 (noting that many countries do not actually have
the resources to institute the changes).
364 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 29:353
The Central Authority’s duties are to ensure day-to-day compliance
with the Hague Convention’s overall goal of serving the best interests
of the children.102 The duties include preventing improper ªnancial
gain in connection with an adoption,103 collecting and preserving in-
formation about each child and prospective adoptive parent(s),104 and
facilitating the goal of adoption.105 To facilitate these operations, the
Central Authority may delegate some responsibilities to other public
authorities or other bodies.106 Once accredited, these bodies may only
operate on a non-proªt basis, must be staffed by people qualiªed to
work in international adoption, and are under the supervision of the
Central Authority with respect to operation and ªnances.107
More speciªcally, the Central Authority for the country of the pro-
spective parent(s) must determine eligibility and prepare a compre-
hensive report about the applicant(s).108 The Central Authority of the
child’s home country must also determine adoptability and prepare a
parallel report on the child.109 Each Central Authority must review the
other’s report and agree on each speciªc adoption before it takes
place.110 These requirements are signiªcant in international adoption,
as they facilitate detailed communication between each involved coun-
try and ensure from the outset that an adoption can proceed.111 This
eliminates the danger that a prospective parent may not meet the re-
quirements or standards of the child’s home country, and thus be re-
jected after the investment of signiªcant time, money, and emotion in
the process.112
Further, each Central Authority must take all necessary steps to
ensure that the child can leave his or her home country and subse-
quently be able to enter and permanently reside in the parental coun-
try.113 Again, the fact that the Central Authorities are required to en-
sure emigration and immigration for the child eliminates the possibility
                                                                                                                     
102 See Hague Convention, supra note 23, pmbl., art. 6.
103 Id. art. 8.
104 Id. art. 9(a).
105 Id. art. 9(b).
106 Id. art. 9.
107 Id. art. 11.
108 Hague Convention, supra note 23, art. 15.
109 Id. art. 16(1)(a).
110 See id. art. 17.
111 See id. art. 17.
112 Cf. Bartholet, supra note 5, at 186–90 (describing the negative implications of the
current restrictive immigration laws in the United States).
113 Hague Convention, supra note 23, art. 18.
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that an almost-complete adoption will be halted in the last step due to
conºicting or misunderstood laws between parties.114
The Hague Convention’s requirements for the creation and du-
ties of each Central Authority thus signiªcantly streamline the process
of international adoption and ensure full disclosure of information
and compliance with each country’s laws.115 These basic, practical re-
quirements advance the Hague Convention’s goal of facilitating in-
ternational adoption in the child’s best interests.116 Even though these
are only minimum requirements, their implementation raises serious
questions about their enforceability and practicality.117 Romania’s ex-
perience demonstrates those difªculties.118
B. Romania’s Failed Efforts to Comply with Both the Hague Convention and
EU Membership Requirements
In 1997, the Romanian government created the Department for
Child Protection (DCP), with the goals of (1) creating a comprehen-
sive, country-wide plan to monitor children’s rights and (2) develop-
ing internal legislation that would bring Romanian law into line with
other countries.119 When the Romanian government began to under-
take reforms in 1997, 98,872 children resided in institutions.120 Of
these children, more than half had two known parents, but they were
placed in institutions along with actual orphans because they had had
no contact with either parent for at least six months.121 The DCP im-
plemented a new philosophy for institutions (renamed “placement
centres”) ostensibly to recognize and observe the rights of every child,
to provide a familial atmosphere for children, to integrate the center
as a part of the local community, to train staff professionally, and to
reduce the number of children living in residential care.122
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Despite these admirable and well-intentioned goals, implementa-
tion has been difªcult.123 The decentralization meant that local
authorities were responsible for funding, resulting in vast differences
between institutions across the country that depended on local
ªnancing.124 The local authorities also disagreed on the priority to be
given to child welfare reform in their respective budgets.125 Universities
only re-established degree programs in social work and therapy training
in 1990, thus hindering the goal of professionalized staff—arguably one
of the most important aspects of the reform, as it sought to provide
trained social workers, nurses, and teachers.126 The need for individuals
specialized in these areas thus exceeded the supply, which was wors-
ened by the fact that salaries in institutions were very low.127
In view of the fact that Romania was one of the ªrst to ratify the
Hague Convention, the DCP could logically have been structured as
Romania’s Central Authority.128 The country ignored this aspect of
the Hague Convention, however, and arguably ignored the overall
goal of facilitating international adoption at all, by proposing the rela-
tively drastic measure of de-centralizing orphanage and institutional
care for children, essentially leaving control to local authorities.129
Thus, while Romania was focused on satisfying the European Un-
ion’s mandate that children’s rights be made a priority, it failed to fa-
cilitate international adoption procedures as part of these rights.130
Romania essentially disregarded the obligations it had pledged to re-
spect by signing the Hague Convention.131 Rather than recognize in-
ternational adoption as an integral part of developing a child welfare
program, Romania solely concerned itself with satisfying the EU’s re-
quirements of having an adequate domestic child care system.132
Due to the dire status of institutionalized children in Romania, the
Romanian government, with the apparent support of the EU, may have
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viewed overhauling its internal child welfare program as the most im-
portant step in its human rights compliance project.133 This view, how-
ever, was shortsighted.134 Both the Romanian government and the EU
should have recognized that the obligation to comply with the Hague
Convention was not a separate, external step to be dealt with later but a
means of enhancing the welfare of Romania’s children as a whole.135
Perhaps if Romania and the EU had explicitly recognized interna-
tional adoption as an integral aspect of improving children’s welfare,
the program would have had a better chance at success.136 Instead, be-
cause of the virtual ban on international adoption ofªcially imposed in
2005, the goals of the Hague Convention have not been met.137
In 1997 and 1998, the EU Commission praised Romania’s progress
and implementation of de-centralization and improved forms of
care.138 The EU status report noted encouraging evidence that more
children were being re-integrated into their families or adopted by fos-
ter parents.139 In 1999, however, the annual report bluntly stated that
living conditions in all child care institutions had seriously deteriorated
in only a year, and that the institutions’ basic infrastructure, hygiene,
medical care, nutrition, and general assistance were unacceptable.140
The report mandated that the Romanian government give top
priority to child protection and take back primary responsibility from
local authorities to ensure the welfare of children in residential insti-
tutions.141 The report explicitly stated that the government needed to
improve food, medical services, clothing, heating, and staff.142
Yet the EU failed to note that a comprehensive system for interna-
tional adoption could greatly help Romanian orphans.143 Perhaps the
EU Commission felt that a government that was incapable of providing
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such basics as clean facilities and adequate food for children could not
implement an additional program.144 It is more likely, though, that the
EU simply failed to emphasize the important role of international
adoption in improving the lives of children by removing them from
substandard institutional care and into the homes of loving families, as
the Hague Convention had emphasized several years earlier.145
Regardless, with the admonishment jeopardizing its EU member-
ship bid, the Romanian government created a new agency, the Na-
tional Agency for the Protection of the Child’s Rights.146 The Agency
did adopt new goals for child welfare—improving parental responsi-
bility, discouraging abandonment, supporting families in difªculty,
and bringing greater transparency to adoption.147 While this new
agency could have functioned as a Central Authority under the Hague
Convention, the government again failed to speciªcally address inter-
national adoption, thus failing to take the Hague Convention objec-
tives fully into account.148
The 2000 EU Commission report ªnally addressed the adoption
issue, expressing particular concern that Romania’s legislation gov-
erning adoption practices allowed considerations other than the best
interest of the child to inºuence adoption decisions.149 The Roma-
nian government responded to this negative report by placing its
children’s agency directly under the Secretary General, which the EU
Commission subsequently praised as an important development in
dealing with children’s issues.150 Almost immediately afterwards, how-
ever, Romania suspended all intercountry adoptions.151
Unfortunately, the EU Commission praised this moratorium as “a
mechanism to end practices that were incompatible with Romania’s
international obligations.”152 Instead of recognizing that international
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adoption could have provided a welcome alternative to the lives many
children faced in Romanian institutions, the EU focused on the re-
duction in opportunities for child trafªcking and other abuses.153
While these are legitimate concerns, of course, the EU could have en-
couraged a system to regulate them within a ºuid system of adoption,
rather than closing off the beneªts of adoption in favor of none at
all.154 The moratorium was intended as a temporary measure to allow
the Romanian government to institute new procedures of interna-
tional adoption.155
Yet, even before legislative reforms could be seriously considered,
Emma Nicholson, the European Union’s special envoy to Romania,
harshly criticized the country for its persistent abandonment of chil-
dren, child abuse and neglect, child trafªcking, and particularly, inter-
national adoption’s role in contributing to these dangers.156 Nicholson
determined in 2004 that Romania was simply not respecting the mora-
torium that it had imposed on itself three years earlier.157
When, in February 2004, the Italian government announced pub-
licly that Romania had sent 105 children to its country under dubious
pretexts, the EU issued a warning to Romania to halt all international
adoption in violation of the moratorium or face an end to its EU mem-
bership bid and a loss of all ªnancial aid.158
In light of this criticism, Italian ofªcials reversed their initially
negative stance, defending the 105 adoptions by Italian families as hu-
manitarian and in the best interests of the children.159 But these adop-
tions were only part of the picture.160 Romania may have sent as many
as 1000 adoptees abroad in contravention of the 2001 ban, although
only Italy spoke openly, thus allowing the EU to take a clear stand
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against Romania’s membership if the adoption system was not cleaned
up.161
In response, Romania passed legislation in June 2004 that re-
placed the apparently ignored moratorium with, in effect, an outright
ban on all international adoptions of Romanian children.162 The gov-
ernment passed the legislation in the face of opposition by the United
States, which favored a lifting of the moratorium and staunchly op-
posed a permanent adoption ban.163 The U.S. ambassador to Bucha-
rest described the law as a “tragedy,” as it would bar thousands of fami-
lies from legitimately adopting some of the 40,000 orphans in
Romania thereby providing them with a high standard of living within
the United States.164 Nonetheless, the law came into force on January
1, 2005.165 The United States is still ªercely ªghting the law—in No-
vember of 2005, Rep. Chris Smith of New Jersey introduced legisla-
tion in the House of Representatives that urged Romania to reform its
adoption policies in order to allow international adoption for institu-
tionalized children.166 And, indeed, the ban has left thousands of Ro-
manian orphans—many of them infants under the age of two—in an
indeªnite institutional limbo.167
In essence, Romania has ignored the obligations it assumed upon
ratiªcation of the Hague Convention.168 The EU has assisted this abro-
gation by supporting a ban on international adoption, when it should
have, and could have, helped Romania develop an honest and effective
system of international adoption looking to the best interests of chil-
dren.169
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C. Hague Convention Implementation in the United States
In stark contrast to Romania’s inaction on its Hague Convention
responsibilities, the United States has taken signiªcant steps to imple-
ment the treaty.170 The United States signed the Hague Convention on
March 31, 1994, but it has not yet ratiªed it.171 The Department of State
is in the process of readying implementation as of March 2006, and will
presumably ratify the Hague Convention upon completing implemen-
tation.172
When the United States does ratify the Hague Convention, its
readiness to implement it should be far better than that of Romania.173
Romania hastily ratiªed the Hague Convention without any implemen-
tation measures in place, and the social and political atmosphere sur-
rounding the treatment of children and adoption is radically different
from that of the United States.174 One obvious difference between the
two countries is the fact that the United States is a “receiving” country
for international adoption, whereas Romania is a “sending” country.175
The primary focus of the United States is thus not in facilitating adop-
tion of its children but in preparing prospective parents to adopt chil-
dren internationally.176
The United States began its preparation for Hague Convention
implementation in 1998, under President Clinton.177 Within two
years, Congress passed The Intercountry Adoption Act of 2000178 and
authorized the United States to ofªcially ratify the Hague Conven-
tion.179 The Intercountry Adoption Act (IAA) provides for implemen-
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tation of all the major Hague Convention requirements.180 It desig-
nates the Department of State as the Central Authority,181 with the
Secretary of State responsible for ensuring that the Central Authority
functions in compliance with the Hague Convention.182
The IAA resolves many of the major obstacles that prospective
U.S. parents had previously faced in the process of international
adoption.183 These obstacles include unclear and narrow deªnitions
about who qualiªes as an adoptable “orphan,”184 complex immigra-
tion procedures,185 and varying state-speciªc adoption laws.186
Without the Hague Convention’s mandate of a Central Authority
with speciªc duties to ensure streamlined immigration procedures, the
United States probably would not have implemented federal legislation
like the IAA.187 Traditionally, adoption is governed speciªcally by indi-
vidual states.188 Immigration procedures, on the other hand, are within
the jurisdiction of the federal government, and so federal legislation
was necessary to govern international adoptions.189
The IAA, as of March 2006, is yet to be fully implemented,
though in February 2006, the United States took a signiªcant step to-
wards implementation by ªnalizing the rules governing the accredita-
tion of adoption agencies.190 The IAA can be expected to have, along
with the Hague Convention itself, a dramatic and welcome impact on
U.S. procedures, as compared to the current immigration process for
foreign-born adoptees in the United States.191
Currently, unless the Citizenship and Immigration Service (for-
merly the Immigration and Naturalization Service) grants a child en-
tering the United States either status as a citizen or as a Legal Perma-
nent Resident,192 a child cannot enter and thus cannot reside in the
                                                                                                                     
180 See id.; supra notes 37-55.
181 42 U.S.C. § 101(a)(1).
182 See id. §§ 101(a)(2), 102.
183 See Bartholet, supra note 5, at 187–90.
184 See id. at 187–88.
185 See Lewin, supra note 6, at 294–307.
186 See Hubing, supra note 5, at 690.
187 See Bartholet, supra note 5, at 195.
188 See Lewin, supra note 6, at 292.
189 See id.
190 Press Release, Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Dept. of State,
State Department Issues Final Rules on Intercountry Adoption (Feb. 16, 2006), http://
usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washªle-english&y=2006&m=February&x=2006
0216142905mvyelwarc0.1766016&t=livefeeds/wf-latest.html [hereinafter Final Rules Press
Release].
191 See Lewin, supra note 6, at 292–307.
192 See id. at 291.
2006] The Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption 373
country with his or her adoptive parents.193 A child who is a foreign
national and is adopted in his or her home country by a U.S. citizen
or citizens is not currently automatically entitled to emigrate to the
United States, nor is he or she entitled to naturalization as a U.S. citi-
zen.194 The adoptive parents must petition to have the child desig-
nated as an orphan.195 Under U.S. law, the child must be under age
sixteen, with parents who have died, abandoned the child, or are in-
capable of caring for him or her.196
Though this deªnition of orphanage seems comprehensive and
simple, if the child’s own country of origin deªnes an “adoptable”
child differently, the United States might deny entry or citizenship to
a child who was legally adopted in his foreign home country but does
not meet all the requirements of an “orphan” under U.S. law.197 For
example, some foreign countries permit a sole parent to “release” a
child for adoption, but the United States requires that such release be
irrevocable and speciªcally note that the child is to emigrate to the
United States.198 The United States further requires evidence that a
sole parent is unable to care for the child’s basic needs, measured by
the local standard in the home country.199 Thus, if the child has two
known parents (in a married or familial relationship) who wish to
surrender the child because of inability to provide him or her with
basic care, the United States will not consider that child an orphan
and thus will not permit the child to emigrate to the United States.200
Similarly, the United States will consider a child abandoned if two
parents have unconditionally given him or her up to a state-run or-
phanage but not if the birth parents have “surrendered” the child to
prospective adoptive parents.201
The IAA speciªcally addresses these complex issues by requiring,
before the adoption takes place, that the Central Authority be respon-
sible for ensuring that a particular child will be able to emigrate le-
gally to the United States.202 The Central Authority, working directly
with its counterpart authority in the child’s country of origin, will be
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able to clarify that country’s laws and rules for qualifying children as
“adoptable,” and thus ensure that each adoption by a child outside of
the United States will comply with U.S. immigration laws.203 Further,
the IAA radically simpliªes the ªnal process by requiring that any
adoption ªnalized in another country—which necessarily must take
place under the Central Authority—will be recognized as a ªnal, valid
adoption for all purposes of federal and state law.204 This eliminates
the unnecessary barrier between an adoption and a child’s ability to
live with his or her legal parents in the United States.205
In sum, the United States, as a result of all its preparation and its
prominent participation in international adoptions, should be able to
implement the Hague Convention with relative ease.206 Existing struc-
tures and procedures will be altered to simplify the process and provide
centralized accountability, as the Hague Convention envisioned in its
overall goal of facilitating international adoptions for the best interests
of children.207 The United States has fully embraced the Hague Con-
vention and readied its laws and processes accordingly.208 This is dia-
metrically opposed to Romania’s complete failure to do the same.209
III. Analysis
A. Problems with the Hague Convention, As Seen by the
Situation in Romania
While the Hague Convention represents a signiªcant step towards
ensuring minimum standards in regulation of international adoption,
it does not go far enough.210 Romania quickly signed and ratiªed the
treaty, pledging acceptance of its theory and requirements.211 The Ro-
manian government, however, never made signiªcant steps towards any
sort of implementation.212 More importantly, the government never
seemed to embrace the basic premise of the Hague Convention that
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international adoptions can serve the best interests of children.213 As a
ratiªer of the Hague Convention, Romania continues to have a legal
obligation to abide by its terms.214
The European Union is in a unique position to ensure that Ro-
mania abides by these obligations.215 Since its initial application to
enter the EU, Romania has demonstrated its willingness to follow the
EU’s recommendations and requirements.216 But while nineteen of
the EU’s twenty-ªve member states have signed the Hague Conven-
tion,217 the EU’s support of a virtual outright ban on international
adoption in Romania misinterprets the proposition at the heart of the
Hague Convention.218 Although the EU has correctly mandated that
Romania ensure child welfare and rights as a condition of its admis-
sion, its focus on the conditions of institutionalized children and a
ban on international adoption means that the EU is effectively only
addressing a fraction of the whole problem.219
Institutionalized children unquestionably need a clean, healthy,
and supportive environment,220 but the EU should recognize that the
goal should be to have as few children in institutions as possible.221
This can be achieved by four means: preventive measures to reduce
the number of abandoned children;222 efforts to reunite children with
their families;223 domestic adoption;224 and international adoption.225
By foreclosing the option of international adoption, Romania, with
the support of the EU, is effectively keeping more children in institu-
tions than need to be.226 By focusing on the threat of child trafªcking,
the EU is seeing only the negative potential of international adoption
and is ignoring its positive potential.227 The EU should exert its con-
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siderable power over Romania by shifting its position in favor of the
ban on international adoption to a full and comprehensive effort to
put a workable system of international adoption into place.228 Only by
the EU initiating a move in this direction will the children of Romania
be given a full opportunity to “grow up in a family environment, in an
atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding,” as the Hague
Convention implies is their fundamental human right.229
The members of the Hague Conference can help facilitate this
change by publicly supporting the European Union to change its posi-
tion.230 Because Romania has pledged its allegiance to the Hague Con-
vention and yet has failed to recognize its obligations even minimally,
the Hague Conference members should be obligated to help rectify the
situation.231 A public declaration by the member states would demon-
strate solidarity with each other, saying that they are invested in the re-
alization of the Hague Convention, regardless of whatever difªculties a
particular country may encounter in its implementation.232
Additionally, UNICEF, the United Nations Children’s Fund, would
be in a powerful position to advocate for this position.233 UNICEF has
staunchly advocated that children unable to remain in and be raised by
their natural family should be placed in alternative family settings
rather than institutional care.234 It has acknowledged international
adoption as the best alternative in certain situations and has strongly
supported the Hague Convention’s focus on ensuring that such adop-
tions proceed in the best interests of the child.235 With the support of a
major, internationally recognized children’s advocacy organization, a
potential EU quest to carry out the best interests of Romania’s children
by requiring the country to institute a workable system of international
adoption would have a good chance of success.236
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The Hague Conference should also consider further amending
the Hague Convention to institute implementation assistance.237 By in-
cluding non-member states in drafting the Hague Convention, the
Hague Conference recognized the special role that some countries play
in international adoption.238 These countries, like Romania, represent
largely “sending” countries in international adoption proceedings, yet
they also tend to have the most unstable or ill-equipped governments,
making implementation of the Hague Convention exceedingly
difªcult.239 For the Hague Convention goals to be realized, each coun-
try must domestically institute its requirements.240 While it is, of course,
a fundamental principle of international sovereignty that each country
determine how to govern and institute international treaties independ-
ently, the Hague Convention should be amended to provide for a
committee to develop a plan that would guide and assist these coun-
tries in realizing the Hague Convention requirements.241
B. Problems with the Hague Convention as Evidenced by the United States
Clearly, a country like the United States is able to institute the
requirements of the Hague Convention and easily adhere to its broad,
overall goals and procedures.242 Once the United States ofªcially
ratiªes the Convention and brings the IAA into full effect, however, its
international adoption procedures could highlight the Hague Con-
vention’s smaller, more nuanced problems.243
The Hague Convention lacks deªnitions of certain terms that
could result in serious disputes.244 Most signiªcant, and potentially
most disputative, is the Hague Convention provision stating that “[t]he
recognition of an adoption may be refused in a Contracting State only
if the adoption is manifestly contrary to its public policy, taking into ac-
count the best interests of the child” (emphasis added).245 Without a
deªnition of what might be “manifestly contrary” to public policy, the
provision allows wide discretion for a country to deªne its own stan-
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dards.246 Yet the inclusion of the qualifying word “manifestly,” rather
than simply “contrary to public policy,” seems to set up a heightened
standard.247 Additionally, the phrase “taking into account the best in-
terests of the child” adds to this sense that the Hague Convention is
restricting a country’s total discretion to deªne its own terms.248 The
Hague Convention, however, includes no review or appeals process for
adoption cases rejected by one country on public policy grounds.249
Thus, the addition of the qualifying and seemingly restrictive phrases
may have no force whatsoever; if a country decides to reject an adop-
tion on the grounds that it is contrary to public policy, the prospective
adoptive parents and the other contracting country have no means of
redress.250 Questions also remain about what adoptions may be consid-
ered contrary to public policy. Presumably, the categories could include
inter-racial adoption,251 inter-religious adoption,252 inter-ethnic adop-
tion,253 as well as adoption by single people,254 same-sex couples,255 or
people over or under a certain age.256
In the U.S. courts, a long standing principle of international law
is that a foreign country’s law that merely differs from that of the
United States does not make it automatically contrary to public pol-
icy.257 Presumably, this applies to international adoption as well—
mere incompatibility of laws does not translate into a situation “mani-
festly contrary to public policy.”258 Instead, “[t]here must be some-
thing which offends by shocking moral standards, or is injurious or
pernicious to the public welfare.”259 In the United States, courts rarely
ªnd foreign adoptions “repugnant,” but when they do, it is usually
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those that fail to mimic U.S. notions of the nuclear family, thus pri-
marily impacting single parents and same-sex couples.260 Currently,
Florida is the only state that speciªcally bans same-sex couples from
adopting children.261 Other states, such as Nebraska and Ohio, effec-
tively ban same sex couples from adopting by prohibiting “second
parent” adoptions by gay individuals in same-sex relationships.262
Thus, same-sex couples who jointly parent adopted children must
choose only one of them to become the legal adoptive parent.263 The
child has no legal rights to government beneªts if the non-adoptive
parent dies or is disabled, and that parent has no legal right to parent
the child if the adoptive parent is incapacitated or dies.264
Some countries, such as China, speciªcally prohibit same-sex cou-
ples from becoming adoptive parents.265 China classiªes homosexuality
as a psychiatric disease, and the country’s laws only recognize families
as those with married parents of the opposite sex.266 The Hague Con-
vention would presumably allow China to classify an intercountry adop-
tion by same-sex couples as “manifestly contrary to public policy.”267
The United States position would not be as clear, however.268 The Cen-
tral Authority might grant same-sex couples status (or deny such status)
as qualiªed parents based on the laws of their home state.269 It would
have to determine if legally married same-sex couples from Massachu-
setts should be granted special consideration,270 or whether they should
be treated exactly like a same-sex Florida couple that is expressly pro-
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hibited from adopting by state law.271 To resolve these conºicting issues,
the Central Authority might look to the federal Defense of Marriage
Act, which could arguably show that families with same-sex parents are
contrary to U.S. public policy.272 Because adoption law is so deeply and
traditionally entrenched within individual state law, the Central Author-
ity would probably have to make its determinations of parental accept-
ability based on such state laws.273 The United States is implementing a
single Central Authority within the federal government, even though
the Hague Convention would have allowed for Central Authorities in
each individual state in the country.274 This choice establishing uni-
formity, however, is contravened if the same people, going through the
same evaluation and application process, can be granted acceptable
parental status by residing in Massachusetts but denied such status
when residing in Florida.275 Initially, the Central Authority should ad-
here to home-state laws for these determinations.276 These issues, how-
ever, are sure to arise almost immediately after the Central Authority is
instituted under the State Department, perhaps forcing the federal
government to more closely examine the issue of same-sex parenting.277
Another issue that the Central Authority in the United States will
face is how to interpret the Hague Convention requirement that no
one may “derive improper ªnancial or other gain” from intercountry
adoptions.278 That Article goes on to state that “[o]nly costs and ex-
penses, including reasonable professional fees of persons involved in
the adoption, may be charged or paid,” but this qualiªcation does little
to deªne what “improper ªnancial or other gain” and “reasonable pro-
fessional fees” mean exactly.279 Presumably, the provisions are vague so
as to allow the country and its Central Authority ºexibility to determine
deªnitions on their own, but costs in intercountry adoptions can vary
by tens of thousands of dollars.280 In some countries, bribes thinly
veiled as “gifts” are commonplace.281 A serious issue could arise over
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whether these gifts remain acceptable under the Hague Convention if
they are not so large as to constitute “improper” gain, or if the fact that
they are unofªcial, yet tacitly required, payments make them forbidden
given the overall Hague Convention goal of putting international adop-
tion under regulated oversight.282
The U.S. Central Authority should mandate a clear policy that no
payments outside of professional fees should be involved in interna-
tional adoptions in any way.283 Because all international adoptions must
go through the Central Authority, it has the power to accredit those
outside adoption agencies that deal with the day-to-day processes of
each individual adoption.284 The Central Authority thus has the power
to monitor the exact rates that each agency charges over the course of
the adoption.285 The Central Authority also has power to institute an
adverse action against an accredited agency and remove its accredita-
tion, which could presumably be based upon excessive fees.286
The Central Authority should make a clear policy available to all
prospective adoptive parents that any fees above and beyond those
charged by the monitored agency are completely unacceptable.287
The Central Authority should ensure that prospective parents have an
open avenue of communication with their home Central Authority—
particularly when they are actually in the process of adopting in a for-
eign country—for reporting any suspected illegal demands or expec-
tations of payment.288 Because the U.S. Central Authority will have
worked closely with the Central Authority of the child’s home country
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in instituting the adoption in the ªrst place, the U.S. Central Author-
ity should address each speciªc reported abuse immediately with the
other country’s Central Authority.289 Only this sort of swift, ªrm
communication between Central Authorities will ensure that prospec-
tive parents are not taken advantage of and that no individual or
agency receives any sort of undue ªnancial gain from the adoption.290
These two major issues concerning public policy and ªnancial
matters highlight the need for the Hague Convention to further
deªne the vague terms within its provisions, as well as provide some
appeals or enforcement procedures.291 Additionally, the Hague Con-
vention should be amended to include some sort of implementation
assistance to aid “sending” countries like Romania in setting up a
Central Authority to enable them to fully participate in monitored
international adoption procedures.292
Conclusion
While the Hague Convention represents a signiªcant step towards
ensuring that all international adoptions are governed by certain
minimum standards, keeping the best interests of the child paramount,
the Hague Convention falls short in two signiªcant respects. First, the
Hague Convention’s regulations are most needed in countries like
Romania, where large numbers of institutionalized children are in dire
need of stable families and thus could beneªt greatly from a regulated
system of international adoption. The Hague Convention, however, is
least likely to be effectively instituted in such countries because the
same political and economic strife that results in large numbers of chil-
dren in need also inhibits the government’s ability to undertake such
extensive structural changes. Thus, the Hague Conference member
states need to either establish committees focused on helping countries
actually implement the Hague Convention’s mandates, or they need to
work closely with the EU and other strong political forces to institute a
realistic implementation. Second, for countries like the United States
that are fully capable of realizing the broad Hague Convention goals,
the Hague Conference members need to amend the Hague Conven-
tion to clarify certain language provisions. Most notably, the members
need to clear up exactly what countries may classify as contrary to their
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public policy, and—more importantly—they need to allow for some
sort of appeals or review process when one country blocks an adoption
on this basis that is otherwise in the child’s best interests. Additionally,
the states need to issue clear guidelines about what constitutes prohib-
ited ªnancial gain in the context of adoptions. If the Hague Conven-
tion develops on both these wide-reaching and smaller-scale levels, it
truly will be a document that fosters the best interests of the children by
facilitating international adoption.
